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For example, in a negligence action an issue arises concerning the
color of a traffic light at the time of an accident. Witness A testifies that the
light was red. Police officer X testifies that shortly after the accident A
told him the light was green. If X's testimony were being offered for the
truth of the assertion as to the color of the light it would clearly be inadmissible as hearsay. But if X's testimony is offered merely to prove that A is not
to be believed because he has made contradictory statements outside of the
court, the testimony is admissible, the hearsay rule being inapplicable. The
same principle applies to the use of books on cross-examination. A witness
who testifies as an expert must qualify for the title of expert, and in order
to do so he must be acquainted with the literature of his field. 35 For that
reason, when counsel uses a book upon cross-examination the issue is not
whether the book states the true opinion of the author, or even whether the
author was correct in his opinion, but whether an expert witness is familiar
with the literature in his field and whether he has honestly and intelligently
read and applied what is set down in the literature. The competent expert
will be able to explain away an inconsistency between his testimony and the
opinions contained in books. His prestige and value to the jury will be
enhanced, not diminished, by so doing. On the other hand, the expert undewithserving of the title will be readily exposed and his testimony neutralized
36
out the cost of calling other experts for "a battle of experts."

Underlying the hearsay argument there seems to be a fear on the part of
the courts that once books are allowed as an aid in cross-examination a harvest
of literature will follow, written with an eye to litigation. Two important
factors, often overlooked, exist why such fears may be allayed. First, those
states which allow the use of books do so subject to the trial judge's discretion. 37 It would not be too difficult for the trial judge to recognize, and
exclude, a book written solely for litigation. Secondly, if books are used in
cross-examination they may be used to rehabilitate the expert's opinion upon
re-direct, even though such books were not originally admissible.38 This latter
factor will act as a deterrent against counsel making promiscuous use of books
upon cross-examination.
Abstracts of Recent Cases
Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts: Wade v. Mayo Overruled?-MAust a
person who has been denied a writ of habeas corpus by the highest state
tribunal petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari before a
lower federal court can consider his application for habeas corpus on its
merits? This question was before the United States Supreme Court in Wade v.
Mayo (334 U.S. 672) and was reconsidered recently in Darr v. Buford (339
U.S. 200). Here the petitioner, an inmate o the Oklahoma state penitentiary,
had applied to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for habeas corpus
on the grounds that he did not have sufficient funds to procure counsel
34. For an excellent discussion of hearsay see Comment, Res Gestae and the Hearsay
Rule in Illinois, 42 Ill.
L. Rev. 88 (1947).
35. State v. Burnette, 28 N.D. 539, 150 N.W. 271 (1917).
L. Rev.
36. Austin, Some Rules Governing the Examination of Witnesses in Illinois, 19 Ill.
57 (1924).
37. See note 18 supra.
38. Yarn v. Ft. Dodge, D. M. & S. R. Co., 31 F. 2d 717 (8th Cir. 1929) ; Hemminghaus v.
Ferguson, Mo. _
215 S.W. 2d 481 (1948) ; State v. Bess, 60 Mont. 558, 199 Pac. 426
(1921); McCourt v. Travers, 87 N.H. 185, 175 Atl. 865 (1934). Contra: New Jersey Zinc
& Iron Co. v. Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co., 59 N.J.L. 189, 35 At. 915 (1896).
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of his own choosing, and that he had not been given sufficient time to
procure and prepare witnesses for his defense. The writ was denied by
the state court on the merits. No application was made to the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari. The petitioner then filed in the
federal District Court for habeas corpus where the writ was denied on
the grounds- that application for certiorari to the Supreme Court is
necessary before a lower federal court can hear such a petition. Certiorari
was sought on this question and was granted by the Supreme Court.
In affirming the decision by the District Court Mr. Justice Reed,
writing for the majority, emphasized the fact that the "responsibility to
intervene in state criminal matters rests primarily upon this Court" and
that the Court should be given the opportunity to consider any charges
that state action has infringed upon the defendant's federal constitutional
rights.
Wade v. Mayo had passed upon a similar question with a contrary result.
While the Court in the present case did not expressly overrule that decision,
it did state that "whatever deviation [the Wade case] may imply from the
established rule [as indicated in the instant case] will be corrected by this
decision." It is interesting to note that the Court did not make this rule too
rigid, stating that special circumstances may exist which would justify a
departure. Whether- such special circumstances exist and create an urgent
situation wherein a petition for habeas corpus should be heard without prior
certiorari to the Supreme Court is a question for the District Court to decide.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing the dissent, attacked the majority opinion
on several grounds. The principal question before the Court, claimed the
dissent, was simply whether Wade v. Mayo should be overruled. That case
was given the utmost consideration, and should be adhered to unless the
rule established therein proved itself to be "mischievous in practice."
According to the dissenting opinion, the rule laid down by the majority
must mean one of two things: (1) that a denial of certiorari would serve
as an adjudication on the merits (unlike other denials) and thus act to
limit the discretion of the District Courts when hearing the petition for
habeas corpus, or (2) such denial would have no legal significance. If the
former alternative is correct it would behoove the Supreme Court to give
full consideration to every petition in this type of case, casting a new
burden on the Court. The second alternative would simply "announce
that a meaningless step in this Court is an indispensable preliminary to
going to the local District Court." (For a discussion of the exhaustion of
state remedies as affecting habeas corpus writs in the Federal Courts, see
Vol. 39, page 357 of this Journal.)
Privileged Communications Between Attorney and Client-Defendant was
charged with conspiring to stuff ballot boxes in a national election. On
conviction, he appealed on the grounds that the District Court erred in
permitting testimony regarding a confession made by him to one Judge
Ardery, claiming that his conversation with the judge was a privileged
communication. It appeared that Judge Ardery (of the Judicial Circuit
of Kentucky), who had been a life long friend of the defendant, had
decided to call a grand jury investigation regarding election frauds in
the county. The evening before the investigation was launched the defendant called upon the judge for advice, and during the course of their
conversation confessed to stuffing the ballot box. The District Court, in
permitting the judge to testify as to the confession, held that one who
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seeks the advice of the judge of the court in which his ease is to be tried
is not entitled to the privilege given confidential communications between
attorney and client. The Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision
of the lower court, pointed out that the witness was the presiding circuit
judge of the county and as such was bound by ethical standards, if not
legal, not to enter into an attorney-client relationship with a person whose
conduct was about to be investigated by a grand jury. Citing Canon 24
of the American Bar Association, the court quoted: "A judge should not
accept inconsistent duties; nor incur obligations, pecuniary or otherwise,
which will in any way interfere or appear to interfere with his devotion
to the expeditious and proper administration of his official functions."
Coming to the conclusion that the witness did not stand in the relationship
of an attorney with the defendant, the Court found that the privilege did
not exist, and the witness could testify as to the confession made to him.
(Prichardv. U.S., 181 F. 2d 326.)
State Control of Gambling as an Exercise of the Police Power-The legislature of the state of Florida enacted a statute which made it unlawful
for any public utility knowingly to furnish any private wire to be used in the
dissemination of information in the furtherance of gambling. Complainants
sought a declaratory judgment in the Supreme Court of the state asking that
such law be declared unconstitutional because it infringed upon federal power
to regulate interstate commerce. In holding that the statute was valid the
court pointed out that although the transmission of the results of baseball
games, prize fights, horse races and other sporting events from other states
was of interstate character, "it does not follow that when the information conveyed is used to bet on a horse race it becomes an article of interstate commerce as contemplated by the Federal Constitution. In fact, when the information is released for the purpose of wagering, it may then be like the
articles in a package when broken, they forfeit their interstate character and
are subject to state regulation." The court noted that speed of transmission
was the essential difference between relaying sporting results by newspaper
and by wire, and that transmission by wire was an important element in
modern organized gambling. Certainly the state, through its inherent police
power, could take steps to cope with this menace to the welfare and morals of
its people. The -use of the police power in this type of situation would not be
curtailed by the commerce clause unless it is "shown to disrupt lines of communication essential to uniformity," and that dissemination of betting information "does not reach this dignity." Such control of gambling information is essentially a domestic regulation and will not be interfered with unless
it is shown to be "arbitrary and unreasonable." (McInerney v. Ervin, 46 So.
2d 458.) (For an excellent discussion on the suppression of bookie operations
by denial of telegraph and telephone services, see Vol. 40, page 176 of this
Journal.)

